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Introduction 
For many years, suspension bridges have been em­
ployed to economic advantage where long uninterrupted 
spans were required. While they have been supplanted for 
most common applications by cantilever and arch bridges 
in the United States, suspension bridges are a valid design 
type. Two American suspension bridges have been in 
service for over 100 years. A new form of suspension 
bridge, the cable-stayed bridge, is widely used in Europe 
and is expected to be as popular in the United States. 
The key to the success of suspension bridges lies in 
the use of high-strength wires that are consolidated into 
the main cables. These cables support very heavy loads, 
compared to common structural-steel members. This 
allows designers of suspension bridges to employ lower 
dead loads than necessary for other types of bridges for 
equivalent live loads and spans. Unfortunately , to achieve 
economy of construction, load-bearing redundancy is 
usually sacrificed in most suspension-bridge designs. If 
a main cable of a suspension bridge should beak, the 
bridge would collapse in a catastrophic manner. There­
fore, defects in the main cable wires of a suspension 
bridge may be significantly more critical than defects in 
structural members of other bridge types. 
In August 1978, the Ohio Department of Trans­
portation closed the U.S. Grant Bridge (US 23) over the 
Ohio River between Portsmouth, Ohio, and South Shore, 
Kentucky. Closure was due to increasing severity of 
corrosion, first detected in the main cables of the bridge 
in 1975. Besides inconveniencing area residents, closure 
created rublic and official concern about the structur­
al integrity of suspension bridges under authority of 
the Kentucky Department of Transportation. The suspen­
sion bridges owned and maintained by Kentucky are the 
Maysville (US 68) Bridge at Maysville and the Ohio River 
(KY 17) Bridge at Covington. 
A month after closure of the Portsmouth Bridge, 
a meeting was held in Frankfort to discuss inspection of 
the suspension bridges. Representatives from the Divisions 
of Bridges, Maintenance, and Research concluded that the 
focus of efforts should be on the Maysville Bridge due to 
its similarity to the Portsmouth Bridge. 
While the Portsmouth Bridge problems were a t t ri· 
buted to corrosion, the exact type(s) of corrosion was 
not known. There was a compelling need to determine 
what types of corrosion would attack suspension bridge 
cables, how this action could be detected, and how the 
severity of any corrosive attack could be assessed. 
In the past, KYDOT had performed yearly inspec­
tions of the suspension bridges. However, access to the 
interior of the cables, located outside the anchorages, 
was prevented after wire was wrapped around the cables. 
As an interim measure, inspection ports or windows were 
installed on the main cables outside the anchorages. These 
ports were to be permanent installations that would facili­
tate future inspection of the cables. The ports were also to 
be used to check for water seepage into the cables. The 
Division of Bridges was assigned the task to design the 
inspection ports. 
The Research Program was assigned responsibility 
for gathering relevant background information. Several 
bridge authorities were consulted, including the Golden 
Gate, the Machinac, and the Triborough Bridge staffs. 
Their maintenance situations differed from those of 
KYDOT. The larger suspension bridges receive continuous 
maintenance, which is not afforded a smaller bridge like 
the one at Maysville. With one exception, no corrosion 
problems had been experienced by those authorities, 
although the extent of their in-depth inspection for this 
type of problem was limited or nonexistent . 
Information on corrosion related to bridge wire and 
some historical data will be compiled in a pending report, 
11Kentucky Suspension Bridges and Corrosion,11 to be 
issued soon by the Kentucky Transportation Research 
Program. During the preparation of that report, it became 
clear that past research pertaining to the subject of bridge 
wire corrosion was inadequate. 
Much of the existing literature dealt with the Ports· 
mouth Bridge, which had experienced corrosion diffi­
culties 30 years ago. The bridge was originally completed 
in 1927. Ungalvanized or bright wires were used in the 
main cables. The main cables were of parallel wire-strand 
construction. The cable wires were coated with red-lead 
paint and wrapped with galvanized wire, as was common 
practice at that time. In 1939, general corrosion and many 
broken wires were detected in the anchorages of the 
bridge. The breaks were concentrated at the st rand anchor 
shoes. Most of the breaks were in the Ohio anchorage on 
the upstream side. A year later, the bridge was recabled 
with galvanized structural strand. 
At the time of the first failure, little was known 
about corrosion cracking. Samples of the bright wire were 
tested for mechanical properties at Carnegie Institute of 
Technology. The investigator, without performing any 
tests to substantiate his claim, hypothesized that the 
first Portsmouth cable problem was caused by stress 
corrosion (I). Later, at the National Bureau of Standards, 
Pollard (2) produced laboratory stress corrosion fractures 
in Portsmouth wire specimens immersed in aqueous 
solutions of nitrates. Unfortunately, many recent re­
searchers have mistakenly presumed that Pollard proved 
the cause of the first cable problems to be stress corro· 
sian. 
Some facts tend to contradict that assumption. Wire 
breaks were observed in the anchorages, where wires were 
exposed to flood waters (on the Ohio side) and dampness. 
The dampness may have been precipitated by moist sand, 
used as a counterweight in the anchorages. When the 
bridge was recabled in 1940, the anchorage eyebars were 
lengthened and extended outside the anchor houses. This 
was done in an effort to keep the new wires out of the 
damp anchor houses and above the high-water level of the 
river. Moisture in the cables at the anchorages was pro­
bably not of the same chemical content as rainwater. It 
would be difficult to deduce how nitrates could be 
furnished, in harmful concentrations, by flood water and 
condensed moisture. If nitrates were in rainwater that 
filtered down the cables, a larger amount of the corrodant 
should have been on the wires at points outside the 
anchorages. However, few breaks were detected at those 
locations. 
Another consideration is that most of the breaks 
occurred on the upstream cable. The dead load was 
almost evenly distributed on the cables. However, due to 
the presence of a sidewalk on the downstream side, the 
live load was greater on the upstream cable. Dead load 
has a predominant effect on stress corrosion and live 
load a more important effect on corrosion fatigue. There­
fore, it could be argued that corrosion fatigue was the 
active mechanism that led to recabling the first bridge. 
In June 1974, Modjeski and Masters Consulting 
Engineers were hired by the Ohio Department of Trans­
portation to inspect the U.S. Grant Bridge. For most of 
the service life of the bridge, it had been under private 
ownership. A superficial inspection revealed rust strains 
on the bottom of the cable wrapping at several locations. 
In August 1975, a more detailed inspection, which en­
tailed unwrapping cover wire for six panels (band-to­
band), revealed localized rust on the cables and a few 
broken wires. In 1978, work was undertaken to remove 
all the wire wrapping and rehabilitate the cables by 
brushing off the rust and rewrapping the cables with a 
neoprene-hypalon protection system. At that time, many 
breaks were detected on the newly unwrapped portions of 
the cables. In addition, the number of breaks detected at 
previously unwrapped locations had increased signifi­
cantly. At that time, Battelle-Columbus Laboratories 
was employed to determine the cause of wire break­
age. Results of the Battelle investigation were presented in 
preliminary form in late June 1978; and shortly there­
after, the bridge was closed ( 3). 
A subsequent Battelle report indicated wires failed 
due to stress-corrosion cracking (4). That report also 
stated the condition of the bridge would worsen with time 
and there was no practical way to rehabilitate the cables. 
No judgment was made as to the physical condition of the 
bridge in the Battelle report. 
The main problem (for subsequent investigators) 
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with the Battelle analysis is that insufficient work was 
done to conclude that stress corrosion was the cause of 
wire breakage. Even with detailed investigations, there is 
often disagreement as to the cause of a service failure. In 
their analysis of the bridge collapse at Point Pleasant, 
researchers at Battelle concluded stress corrosion was the 
cause of failure of that eyebar-suspension bridge (5). 
However, the U.S. Steel Laboratory found evidence that 
corrosion fatigue was involved. 
The basis for the Battelle conclusions about the 
Portsmouth cables was the detection of branched crack­
ing, multiple cracks, and sulfides on the fracture surfaces. 
Those features may also be related to other forms of 
corrosion cracking. Also, it should be pointed out that 
Battelle did not identify a specific atmospheric pollutant 
existing in damaging concentrations in the Portsmouth 
atmosphere. 
Stress-corrosion tests were performed by Boeing 
Aircraft Corp for the FHWA (6) on uncoated and gal­
vanized wires immersed in aqueous-sulfur environments. 
The specimens were notched and subjected to tensile 
stresses exceeding 90 ksi (620 MPa) for the duration of 
the tests ( 10- 14 months). None of the 39 specimens used 
in the tests failed. Results of that work are seemingly in 
contradiction to the Battelle inferral that aqueous sul­
fate/sulfides caused the problems at Portsmouth. Pollard 
(2) was unable to produce stress-corrosion cracking in 
bare Portsmouth Bridge wire in1mersed for 3 1  months in 
aqueous ammonium-sulfate solutions. 
While stress-corrosion-related chemicals could evolve 
from the atmosphere, their concentration in moisture may 
be so slight that, in a stress-corrosion loading environment 
(i.e., a static tensile stress), the corrodants might not be 
active. However, in a fatigue-loading environment, the 
corrodants might have a detrimental effect. In many 
cases, suspension bridges are in a low-cycle fatigue envi­
ronment. 
Ther:e is an attendant implication in the term nstress 
corrosion" that suggests an unusually corrosive atmo­
spheric condition exists, indigenous to the Portsmouth. 
South Shore area, causing the two wire-corrosion pro­
blems. It could be inferred that this corrosive atmosphere 
does not exist in locations where the Kentucky-main­
tained suspension bridges are located. 
Descriptions of other forms of localized corrosion, 
which could cause wire breakage, were also included in 
the draft report "Kentucky Suspension Bridges and 
Corrosion. n These include corrosion fatigue and hydrogen 
cracking. Neither of those mechanisms requires a specific 
corrodant, as does the classical concept of stress corro­
sion. 
Historical literature revealed that bridge-cable 
corrosion problems are not unconunon and that at least 
three suspension bridges in the United States have col­
_Japsed due to that cause. Also, some human-related 
contributory factors may have promoted corrosion 
problems at Portsmouth. The pending report on sus-
pension bridges and corrosion concluded that, regardless 
of the active corrosive mechanisms in either Portsmouth 
corrosion problem, the main factor in the structural 
reliability of a suspension bridge is the condition of the 
corrosion-protection system. 
In most modern bridges, the corrosion-protection 
system usually consists of galvanized coating of the wires, 
red-lead paint on the outer strands, and wire wrapping 
cable. Suitability of that system is suspect for suspension 
bridge applications where constant maintenance is not 
provided. 
After preliminary investigations and review of the 
literature, Transportation Research Program personnel 
began work to determine steps necessary to make an 
accurate assessment of the structural integrity of the two 
suspension bridges owned by Kentucky. Visual field 
inspections were made of the bridges at Portsmouth, 
Covington, and Maysville. Also, a traffic survey was 
performed at Maysville and contact was made with the 
Ohio Department of Environmental Protection to deter­
mine if atmospheric differences existed between Maysville 
and Portsmouth. 
Inspection of the Portsmouth Bridge 
From May 9, 1979, to completion in December 
1979, Research Program personnel monitored recabling of 
the Portsmouth Bridge (Figure !). The work was per­
formed by the American Bridge Division of U.S. Steel 
Corporation. Modjeski and Masters were the consultants, 
and M. Baum was the resident engineer for the Ohio 
Department of Transportation. 
Early inspections of the bridge were made in May 
and June of 1979. The cables had been unwrapped prior 
to the winter of 1 978 ; however, at the time of these early 
inspections, the cable bands were still in place. During 
those inspections, a survey was made of the condition of 
the exterior strands. Additionally, photographs of the 
cables were made and samples of broken wires obtained. 
Exterior strands were severely corroded in many 
locations. At points, all exterior strands showed ferrous 
corrosion or rust (Figure 2). That type of corrosion was 
either evident on all exterior strands for an entire panel 
(band-to-band) or concentrated in the lower strands for 
the entire panel length. Severe rust was present for more 
than one consecutive panel, with the exception of panel 
66-67, downstream, on the Kentucky side. Contrary to 
expectations, severe rusting was observed on both hori­
zontal and inclined portions of the cables. Panels where 
cables were steeply inclined generally contained more 
severe rusting than adjacent panels of less inclination. 
Only one panel (66-67), downstream, had severe 
rusting on the Kentucky side span. Thirty-three of the 40 
main*span panels on the downstream cable were severely 
rusted, while eleven panels on the upstream cable were 
seriously rusted. l11ese were located on the lowest 
(shallowest) portion of the cable. Twelve panels of each 
cable on the Ohio side contained severe rust. 
Corrosion of the zinc coating was evident on the 
exterior strands of the main cables. It was present in the 
form of a powdery white coating on the wires. On the 
lightly corroded strands, the white coating was tena­
ciously attached to the individual wires. In areas where 
the heavy zinc corrosion occurred, but little or no visible 
rusting was identified, the white powder assumed a thick 
fluffy texture, and could be removed by lightly scraping 
with a finger nail. Usually, the steel wire revealed below 
the heavily-corroded zinc was lightly rusted and slightly 
pitted. Spotted rust was visible in most areas where heavy 
zinc corrosion occurred. However, superficial rust was not 
evident in areas of light zinc corrosion. In certain places, 
the aqueous corrodant had a washing action on the cables. 
In these areas, ferrous corrosion and pitting were severe. 
These locations could be identified by the absence of the 
zinc corrosion product. 
Nearly all portions of the cables not severely rusted 
exhibited large amounts of zinc corrosion. This included 
19 panels on each of the downstream and upstream 
cables of the Kentucky span. Seven panels of the down­
stream cable and 28 panels on the upstream cable of the 
main span showed heavy zinc corrosion, but no appreci­
able rusting. Seven panels on both the downstream and 
Figure I. The Portsmouth Bridge early in the recabling 
operation. 
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Figure 2. U. S. Grant Bridge corrosion survey (May. June, 1979). 
upstream cables on the Ohio span also exhibited that be­
havior. 
Portions of cable between the bents and the splay 
saddles appeared in good condition, with the exception of 
the downstream Kentucky side span, which had some 
spotted rust. Most individually exposed structural (helical) 
strands, from the splay saddles to the anchor assemblies, 
were also in good condition, except for some severe zinc 
corrosion on the lower wires of a few strands. Panels 0�1 
of both Ohio span cables were also in good condition. 
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Most of the breaks detected prior to removal of the 
bands were located in the lower portion of the exterior 
strands. Many broken wires were clustered where (I) 
most of the glavanizing was depleted by corrosion, (2) 
the wires were rusted severely, and (3) the inclination of 
the cables was shallow. In areas where nominal rust was 
evident, breaks were infrequent. But a few were found, 
individually or clustered, in groups up to ten, usually near 
the cable bands. This characteristic was prevalent in many 
panels on the Kentucky span and on the steeply inclined 
portions of the main span anJ Ohiu sp:1n. Few breaks 
were cbserved in panels having steep slopes. even \vhen 
corrosion was severe. 
Prior to the band removal, all parties who had in· 
spec ted the cables felt the bridge was structurally sound. 
Some 300-400 breaks had been discovered on the cables 
prior to band removal. Superficial inspection detected 
section losses exceeding 10 percent in both cables. 
In early June 1979, 350 feet (107m) of the center 
span was removed as part of the cable replacement pro­
gram. Remaining portions of the truss were supported 
by temporary stays and A-frames. Before dismantling the 
damaged cables, the suspender cables and bands were re­
moved. When this was accomplished, several important 
discoveries were made. 
Many of the drain holes, located in the packing of 
the vertically split bands, were improperly installed and 
did not allow water to drain from the cables. Though the 
lead-wool packing had been properly driven into the gaps 
between the band halves, water had frozen between them 
and three or four bands had suffered pop·outs. Many new 
wire brcJks were fl)unJ at pc!ints previously covered by 
rhe bands . Under one band. breaks were observed on 
every cxterinr strand. Many breaks were discovered on the 
upper strands. Inspection of the interior strands revealed 
large amounts of corrosion and additional breaks (Figure 
3). Unfortunately, the construction schedule precluded a 
detailed inspection of the interior strands. 
The main cables were removed, strand-by-strand, 
between June 27 and July !8, 1979. Hundreds of new 
breaks were found in the upper interior strands. Most of 
those were detected after the strands had been pulled 
through sheaves and grounded on the river bank. A 
rough count of number of breaks per strand was made 
during the removal operation. It is estimated that each 
cable had about 350 broken wires of the 1,015 total wires 
per cable. This probably represents a 20-30 percent loss 
in the load·carrying capacity of the cables. 
The Portsmouth cable problem was caused by a 
massive failure of the cable protection system (i.e., the 
cable wrapping system and v�ire galvanizing). Pictures 
furnished by the Ohio Dcpa�tment of Transportation 
Figure 3. Portsmouth Bridge, Ohio span, downstream after band removal. 
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showed the cable wrapping to be badly corroded. Ap­
parently, failure to maintain the paint protection on the 
cables led to localized corrosion of the wrapping wire and 
allowed more atmospheric moisture (i.e., rain and melted 
ice) into the cables than would be normally anticipated. 
Inefficient drain holes retained water, which probably 
contained atmospheric corrodants. The combined effect 
of moisture, corrodants, and applied and residual stresses 
eventually led to wire breakage. 
Figure 4 shows a corroded section of the down­
stream cable that typifies the failure process. Localized 
rust on the upper strands was caused by a failure of the 
wire wrapping adjacent to the rusted strands. General 
corrosion was severe in the upper strands. Very little 
white zinc corrosion product remained on the rusted por­
tion of the upper strands. These facts indicate water 
leaked through the upper strands with a washing effect. 
Other portions of the upper strands in that panel were in 
good condition. Apparently, water settled in the lower 
portions of the cable. Because of poor drainage and mild 
slope of the panel, the aqueous corrodant maintained 
long-term contact with the lower strands and was more 
effective in causing wire breakage. Also, the lower strands 
may have experienced higher tensile loads than the upper 
strands. This would contribute to a corrosion-cracking 
type failure at points along the panel away from the 
bands. 
A relationship may exist between the large number 
of breaks at the suspension points (cable bands) and 
concentration of applied stresses at these locations. Ob­
servers indicated breaks were more frequently en­
countered at suspension points where the change in slope 
of the cables between panels was greatest. However, that 
fact was not verified.  lt should be noted that, in panels 
where the effects of large-scale corrosion were not ex­
treme, few breaks were encountered near suspension 
points. Some of those breaks occurred near ends of 
the solid aluminum fillers. Possibly , the galvanized coating 
Figure 4. Portsmouth Bridge, main span, downstream 
side, at Panel 45-46. 
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of the wires was damaged by the sharp filler ends during 
installation. Another possibility is that space between 
the closely-fitted fillers retained moisture, allowing in� 
tense local corrosive attack. 
Several specimens of strand which had no exterior 
corrosion were obtained. Upon separating these speci­
mens, no interior corrosion was observed. However, faying 
surfaces of individual wires exhibited signs of fretting, 
leading to erosion of galvanizing and slight plastic de­
formation of the wire. The wires bore continuous longi­
tudinal marks from contact with neighboring wires in the 
same layer and transverse stripes from the adjacent layer 
of wires, which had opposite lay. 
Specimens of the Portsmouth structural strand also 
indicated capillary action allowed moisture to be re­
tained in the cables. Some strand specimens appeared to 
be in good condition with only slight zinc corrosion near 
the wire interfaces. Splayed specimens revealed zinc corro­
sion and spotted rust on the backside of the exterior 
wires. The second layer of wires was covered with corro­
sion products. The third layer of wires was in good 
condition, as were the other interior layers (Figure 5). 
Structural strand specimens exhibiting washing 
showed severe surface rust, pitting, and little retention of 
the white zinc corrosion product on the exterior layer of 
wires. Despite poor external appearance, the interior 
corrosion was no worse than in specimens previously 
described. 
Severely corroded wires, from locations of poor 
drainage, were externally similar to the washed specimens, 
except for the presence of the white, zinc corrosion pro­
duct. Internal inspection revealed all wires to be severely 
corroded. Fretting marks were visible on those specimens, 
except at points where corrosion had depleted the adja­
cent wires to the extent they were no longer in close con­
tact. Where close contact was maintained, the neighboring 
wires wiped away the corrosion product, exposing the 
bare metal. 
Figure 5. Splayed wire specimen from the Portsmouth 
Bridge. Note uncorroded interior wires. 
The ends of broken wires exhibited two types of 
fracture morphology. Some wires had fractures transverse 
to the longitudinal axes c.f wires. More commonly, a 
transverse fracture eminated from the surface and pene­
trated about halfway through the wire. Thereafter, the 
fracture reoriented itself 45 degrees to the longitudinal 
axis and penetrated through the wire. None of the strand 
specimens revealed fractures in the internal layers that 
were not preceded by fractures in the external layer of 
wires. Some broken wire specimens had a fracture spacing 
of less than 3 inches (75 mm). All wire specimens having 
corrosion fractures exhibited complete zinc corrosion and, 
at best, some light surface rusting. 
The preponderance of wire breaks on the main span 
and Ohio span, compared to the Kentucky span, is attri­
butable to the more extreme deterioration of cable­
protection systems at those locations. Unfortunately, no 
accurate determination was made of the difference in 
number of breaks in the two cables. 
Presence of long-term moisture in the cables de­
finitely should be avoided. There is much doubt about 
the ability of conventional galvanized wire wrapping 
to protect the underlying cables. Small amounts of mois� 
ture contacting the wires in situations such as washing or 
condensation-evaporation may cause accelerated wire de­
terioration ,  or even cracking (especially at points of high 
stress concentrations, such as band suspension points). 
Cable deterioration can be greatly accelerated by the pre· 
sence of corrosive pollutants, such as sulfates, chlorides, 
and nitrates , in the moisture. 
The corrosive decay of galvanized structural strand 
was observed to occur in four stages. During Stage One, 
the strand is in "as new" condition. The zinc coating has a 
bright metallic appearance, though some slight spot 
corrosion of the zinc may be evident in the form of a thin 
whlte powdery coating. The strand is in good condition 
during Stage Two. Exposure to the atmosphere has given 
the zinc a dull-gray appearance. The white corroded-zinc 
fllm may be present near the interfaces and on the ex­
terior surfaces of the wires. If the white film is removed 
by scraping, no rust is evident. The second layer of wires 
may be in worse superficial condition than the outer 
layer, but, as long as the outer layer of wires is stable, the 
interior wires will probably remain structurally sound. 
Much of the strand is covered with a thick white 
zinc corrosion product in Stage Three. Spotted rust is also 
visible on the wires. When the corrosion product is 
scraped off, the steel under the surface reveals some rust 
and pitting . Wire breakage is possible during this stage; 
however, the breaks will not be clustered in large num­
bers, except near points of high stress concentration. 
During Stage Four, the strand will be severely rusted 
and pitted. Some zinc corrosion will be displaced by 
corrosion of the underlying steel (rust). The wires will 
have a speckled brownish-red and white appearance. If 
loading and corrosion conditions are severe, the strand 
will develop many fractures and will eventually fail. 
Inspection of the Maysville Bridge 
Inspection of the Maysville Bridge (Figure 6) began 
in June 1979. The bridge had been in continuous service 
for 49 years . It had no known history of corrosion pro· 
blems. The first three inspections (June-August I 979) 
consisted of external observation of the wrapped cables 
and the splayed structural strands inside the bridge ancho­
rages. 
The cables were last painted in I974. Externally, 
the paint was in fair condition. Transverse cracks had de­
veloped in the paint on the upper portion of the cables 
(Figure 7). Paint had peeled off lower surfaces of the 
cable in spots. That usually happened where the inclina­
tion of the cables was slight. The upper surface of the 
downstream, Kentucky side, span cable wrapping was in 
poor condition from the bent to the anchorage .  At that 
location, the cable had been subject to considerable foot 
traffic (the cables were equipped with hand rails). Many 
points on the sides of the cables, adjacent to the bands, 
showed signs of frequent peeling in the previous top coat 
of paint. 
The suspender cables were in good condition, ex­
cept for a few hangers that had been damaged by passing 
vehicles. These have subsequently been repaired. Unlike 
the Portsmouth Bridge, which was designed to have drain 
holes on each band, only two drain holes were provided 
for each cable on the Maysville Bridge. These were located 
in the lower packing of the bands, in the center of the 
midspan, bordering Panel 69-69. The cable was horizontal 
between the drain-equipped bands. 
Inspection of bands, which had no drain holes, re­
vealed that packing on the underside of several bands had 
been forced out. Adjacent to many of these pop-outs were 
rust-colored stains on the cast-steel band halves (Figure 8). 
During an early inspection,  after a rain ,  water was seen 
dripping from the s tained portion of one band that had 
suffered a packing pop-out .  
Entrance to the anchor chambers waS made through 
manholes on the bridge sidewalk. An access ladder des· 
cended from each manhole, some 40 feet (I 2 m), to the 
anchor-house floor. The ladders did not have safety rings 
required by OSHA regulations. The anchorages had two 
interconnected chambers, each housing one anchor 
assembly and cable. The chambers were dark and unlit. 
The chamber floors and pedestals were dusty, with 
some debris scattered on the floors. 1l1e chamber walls 
and ceilings showed a large amount of efflorescence and 
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Figure 6. The Maysville Bridge. 
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Figure 7. Transverse cracks in paint on the main cables 
of the Maysville Bridge. 
were covered with a black mastic compound, which was 
probably employed as a water sealant. Graffit i  was present 
on the walls, indicating that chambers had been trespassed 
and violated on several occasions. Small drains were 
located near the ladder bases. However, a large damp spot 
adjacent to the drain of the downstream Ohio chamber in­
dicated this drain was clogged. 
Each anchor chamber had two windows ; one, 
mounted on the sidewall, and the other on the headwall 
facing the river. These were fitted only with bird screen. 
The presence of many bird skeletons on the anchor-house 
floors indicated that most of the screens were not func­
tional. The sidewall windows were located adjacent to and 
slightly elevated over the anchor assemblies. 
The splay saddles were mounted on the chamber 
headwalls. Sixty-five structural strands radiated from each 
saddle to an anchor assembly resting on the highest of 
three concrete pedestals (Figure 9). The anchor assemblies 
consisted of rows of large vertically mounted steel plates. 
The strands were fastened in the plates by steel end 
Figure 8. Pop-out and stain on the main span, down­
stream cable at hanger U-6 1 .  
Figure 9 .  Maysville Bridge anchor assembly. Note the 
strands enter the anchor assembly through 
sleeve bushings. 
sockets bearing against cast-steel blocks that were bolted 
between the plates. Cast-steel sleeve bushings were 
attached to the strands for protection where the strands 
passed between the bearing blocks. The anchor assemblies 
were pinned to eye bars, which were partially embedded in 
concrete. The strands, observed to be in good-to-fair 
condition, had a base coat cf red-lead primer and a top 
coat of green paint (Figure 10). Painting appeared to have 
been poorly executed. In many places, the green paint was 
not applied over primer. Where the green topcoat was 
present, it was very thick and brittle. The paint and 
primer had chipped off many strands. In spots, the 
galvanizing on the strands \Vas depleted, leaving the usual 
chalky white corrosion product that may be presumed to 
be zinc oxide. In closely inspected areas, no mst was 
detected under the corroded zinc. The condition of the 
strands in the anchorages can be described as Stage 
Two deterioration. The end portion of strands in the 
Figure 10 .  Strands in the Ohio downstream anchor 
house . Note white zinc corrosion deposits on 
the strands. 
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sleeve bushings appeared to be in worse condition. There 
was considerable loose rust and chipped paint in the 
recesses of the sleeves. Due to poor lighting, the exact 
condition of the strands inside the sleeves could not 
be determined. At the splay saddle in the Ohio upstream 
chamber, some washing of red lead or rust from the ex­
terior cable was visible on the lower strands. 
The eyebars and the adjacent portion of the anchor 
assemblies were rusting . The paint work did not appear to 
be satisfactory, especially in areas of poor physical access. 
Scaling and rust were detected along the eye bars at points 
where these were embedded in the concrete. However, the 
loss of section did not appear to be appreciable. The open 
sidewall window next to the anchor assemblies promoted 
corrosion by allowing rainwater and ambient moisture to 
collect on the eyebars and anchor assemblies. Rusting 
was most extensive in the Kentucky downstream anchor­
age. 
During the third week of August 1979, bridge 
maintenance personnel installed seven inspection ports on 
the Maysville Bridge (Figures II and 12). Those were 
located at Panels 0-1, 7-9, 59-61, and 69-69 on the Ohio 
span and the main span (Figure 13). The ports were 
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Figure 12. [nstallation of an inspection port on the 
Maysville Bridge. 
installed near bands having pop-outs and on panels where 
the cable paint had deteriorated. 
Prior to installation of the inspection-port outer 
bands, paint was removed from the cable with a wire 
brush. The outer bands were attached and tightened. 
Then, the wrapping wire between the bands was broken 
and removed. The lower aluminum fillers, in the unwrap­
ped portion of the cable between the bands, were re­
moved with bolt cutters. Before installing the port cover 
plates, the exterior strands of the cables were inspected 
and photographed. After the covers were in place, all 
seams were thoroughly caulked with silicone sealant. 
The exposed cables revealed that, unlike the Ports­
mouth Bridge, the Maysville Bridge strands were individu­
ally covered with a generous coating of red lead. Unfortu­
nately, that coating was deteriorating, and in many loca­
tions, the galvanizing was depleted. 
Figure IJ. Inspection port on Panel 65-63 on the up­
stream main span cable. Note the rust spots 
and red lead coating. 
At all inspection sites, the bottom strands showed 
the greatest corrosion of the zinc coating. All exterior 
strands in Panels Q.) and 69-69 on the downstream cable 
were in very good condition. The upper strands of the 
downstream cable, in Panels )).)3 and 65-63, were also in 
good (early Stage Two) condition. However, many 
bottom strands had extensive zinc corrosion. All the 
external strands on the upstream inspection sites had zinc 
corrosion. Several rust spots were visible on the lower 
strands at Panel 59-61 downstream and at Panel 65-63 
upstream (Figure 13). Galvanizing in those areas was 
severely depleted. Except for the few large rust spots, no 
pitting or light rust was detected under the zinc oxide. 
That indicated Stage Three corrosion was starting at sus­
ceptible locations. 
At several sites, a small quantity of water seeped 
from the cables when the wrapping wire was removed. 
The red-lead coating on the lower strands was disinte­
grating in those locations, and the layer of corroded zinc 
was thicker than on the upper strands. Some water 
probably seeped to the lower portions of the cable be­
tween the wrapping wire and strands. The interior lower 
portion of removed wrapping wire was corroded and had 
spotted rust. Apparently, some moisture seeped through 
the lower portions of the wrapping wire, froze, and caused 
the paint to peel. 
On December 5, 1979, A. Blankenship and B. Crace 
of Bridge Maintenance, M. Bamn of the Ohio Department 
of Transportation, and Research Program personnel 
performed a follow-up examination of the inspection 
ports. At that time, a survey was made of the band­
packing disturbance (Figure 14). Several days before the 
inspection was made, the Maysville area had been sub­
jected to a heavy rain. Water was dripping from popped­
-out packing at many band locations. When most of the 
inspection ports were opened, several quarts of water 
spewed from the cable. Since the port caulking was in 
excellent condition at all locations, it is presumed that 
water entered the cables at the bands or through the 
wrapping wire. Red lead residue was found on the inspec­
tion port covers located on the bottom face of the cables. 
This indicates a flow of water in the cables sufficient to 
cause washing. As the closed inspection ports had 
collected water, drain plugs were omitted from the port 
cover plates on reassembly. 
fnspection of the packing pop-outs was conducted 
from the sidewalk using binoculars. While all the packing 
pop-outs were detected, it is possible that some seepage 
was overlooked. This would be especially true of the up­
stream cable, which was across the roadway from the 
sidewalk. The frequency of band pop-outs indicates that, 
despite the wire wrapping, the cables are virtually porous. 
The presence of pop-outs near the towers shows that a 
significant amount of water can be entrained, either at 
wrapping discontinuities along a single panel or at a 
sealing failure on a band. Seepage of water from a band 
that is one panel lower than another band with a pop-out 
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Figure 14. Maysville Bridge pop-out and water seepage survey. 
indicates that water may be retained a t  the bands. This 
retention may be created by buildup or bridging of 
corrosion products and red lead near the pop-out. 
No wire breaks were observed on the Maysville 
Bridge during any inspection. At that time, it was reason­
able to conclude that the inspection sites chosen are 
representative of the entire bridge, with the possible 
exception of several locations on the Maysville span. 
Although the inspection ports allow limited exami­
nation, the accessible lower-exterior strands may be con­
sidered 11worst-case11 examples for the cables between 
bands. 
The condition of the strands is of concern at sus­
pension points under the bands. Detection of pop-outs 
and water seepage indicates moisture may be present at  
points of high stress concentration. At  bands where 
pop-outs have been observed, washing and partial dam­
ming of water may accelerate deterioration of the gal­
vanized coating on the wires. Inasmuch as corrosion­
fracture resistance of corroded wire seems to be poor and 
s tress at the bands are high, those would be the most 
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likely locations for finding broken wires. If further 
inspection reveals that water seepage is not associated 
with damming at band pop-outs, suspension points that 
had no pop-outs would be suspect. 
Many concerned citizens believe the Portsmouth 
Bridge problems are a warning of impending failure 
of the Maysville Bridge. Conversely, some authorities con­
sider the Portsmouth Bridge problems to be an isolated 
phenomena related to the particular environment of 
Portsmouth. The truth lies somewhere between those 
views. Certainly, the problems at Portsmouth served as a 
warning that a similar situation might arise at Maysville. 
However, the structural integrity of the Maysville Bridge 
does not appear to be impaired at this time. More work is 
necessary to verify that assumption. 
There are several reasons why the Maysville Bridge 
has endured for nearly 50 years and the Portsmouth 
Bridge had failed twice in 53 years. The corrosion protec­
tion of the Maysville Bridge was superior to either of the 
-Portsmouth Bridge cable-protection schemes. The first 
Portsmouth failure may be attributed to a design feature 
that allowed one anchorage to be submerged below 
flood waters. The selection of ungalvanized wire was also 
instrumental in the early failure. It should be noted that 
after the first Portsmouth failure, American suspension 
bridge designers abstained from using bare ungalvanized 
wire. 
The second Portsmouth Bridge cables, while similar 
to the Maysville Bridge in quality of galvanized 
protection, did not possess the lavish red-lead topcoat that 
was on strands of the Maysville Bridge. Much of the 
difference in the condition of the two bridges may be 
attributed to that one feature. The addition of red-lead 
topcoats to individual galvanized strands was not common 
practice. The designers of the Maysville Bridge exhibited 
great foresight in doing that, for it probably prevented 
severe corrosion damage to the cables. The drains designed 
for the second Portsmouth cable consisted of 3/8-inch 
(10-mm) holes drilled through the driven lead-wool 
packing. The resulting holes rarely penetrated through the 
packing. Those which succeeded were probably prone to 
clogging. 
The Portsmouth cables were badly corroded prior 
to the discovery of broken wires in the cables. The detec­
tion of large rust stains on the undersides of the cables in 
1974 indicated either they were not painted often enough 
or the paint used had poor sealing qualities. The Ports­
mouth cables also lacked handrails, preventing inspectors 
from walking the cables and assessing the condition of the 
wrapping wire. 
l11e assumption has been made that airborne pollu­
tants, combined with atmospheric moisture, greatly con­
tributed to the Portsmouth cable problems. Over the life 
of the bridge, the Portsmouth area had a concentration of 
heavy industry located within 3 miles {5 kilometers) of 
the bridge. Area residents reported the pollution was 
worse through the 1960's than today. While the environs 
of the Maysville Bridge consisted mainly of residences and 
small businesses, many chimneys are in close proximity to 
the bridge. Railroad tracks run under both the Ports­
mouth and Maysville Bridges. In the last few years, four 
power plants have been, or are being, constructed in the 
Maysville area. All have tall smokestacks that allow 
pollutants to travel over long distances before settling. In 
the future, the Maysville area may have more pollution 
problems than Portsmouth. 
In August 1979, Research Program personnel 
interviewed S. Giles, Air Division Field Supervisor of the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency for the areas 
neighboring the Maysville and Portsmouth Bridges. Mr. 
Giles furnished information concerning S02 and suspend­
ed particulates taken by continuous monitors in 1978. 
Measurements of both types of pollutants were well below 
federal standards. However, Mr. Giles explained that con­
centrations of these pollutants were expected to be con­
siderably higher near roadways. l11e present atmospheres 
in both cities would not cause, or account for, any un­
usual type of corrosive attack. 
No known, detailed weight measurements have 
been made of traffic over either bridge. The maximum, 
design service stress for the cables of both bridges is 
similar: 76.4 ksi (527 MPa) for the Portsmouth cables and 
70.5 ksi (486 MPa) for the Maysville cables. Because cable 
sag is greater on the Maysville Bridge, it should be capable 
of carrying higher loads than the Portsmouth Bridge. In 
the winters of 1977 and 1978, fuel trucks having 90,000-
pound {400-kN) gross weights were permitted on the 
Portsmouth Bridge. Heavy steel- and coal-hauling trucks 
have frequently used that bridge. One steel-hauling 
truck weighing 104,000 pounds {462 kN) crossed the 
bridge. That truck did not have an overweight permit. 
During the 1970's, many overweight trucks used the 
Maysville Bridge. However, strict enforcement of the 
weight limit has curtailed such abuse. Several times during 
inspection of the bridge, heavily-loaded semitrailer and 
concrete trucks were observed travelling in cloSe suc­
cession, in violation of a posted 30-foot {9-m) mini­
mum-spacing requirement. 
Between August 8-10, 1979, a 48-hour traffic 
survey was conducted at the bridge. Results are shown 
in Table I .  The daily traffic volume was 12,300 vehicles. 
This figure is slightly lower than would be normally 
experienced due to a painting operation conducted on the 
bridge during that period. Several heavily loaded trucks 
were observed using the bridge late at night, when traffic 
on the bridge was otherwise sparse. 
Since extensive construction activities are being con­
ducted in the Maysville area, the bridge may be expected 
to carry considerable heavy traffic in the foreseeable 
future. Unfortunately, traffic flow across both the Mays­
ville and Portsmouth Bridges is poor. All approach spans 
exit to either stop signs or stop lights, causing a large 
number of vehicles to be stopped on the bridges during 
peak periods. 
Table 1. Traffic Su rvey on the Maysville Bridge 
(48 hours) for Both Lanes. 
Type of 
Vehicle Count Percentage 
Autos and Pickups 22,678 92.23 
Buses 10 0.04 
SU-2A-4T 427 1.74 
SU-2A-6T 412 1.67 
SU-3A 161 0.65 
SU-4A 5 0.02 
C-34 31 0.13 
C-4A 74 0.30 
C-5A 776 3.16 
C-6A 12 0.05 
C-7A 0.01 
Total 24,587 100.00 
Note: Survey conducted between 12:00 am on 8-8-79 and 
12:00amon 8-10-79. 
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When the Portsmouth Bridge was closed, it was con­
sidered to be in fair structural condition. However, after 
the bands were removed, the true severity of the wire 
corrosion cracking was revealed. Ironworkers dismantling 
the truss observed deformed splice plates and sheared 
rivets. That indicated either the truss was being subjected 
to extremely heavy loads or the cables were losing their 
load-carrying capacity. 
Inspection of the Covington Bridge 
Inspections were made of the Ohio River Suspen· 
sian Bridge at Covington in June and September of 1 979 
(Figure 15). The scope of work was similar to the exami­
nation of the Maysville Bridge ; however, inspection ports 
were not installed into any of the cables. 
The 1 1 3-year-old bridge has some history of corro­
sion damage to the original cables in the anchor chambers. 
Those anchorages were originally embedded in mortar. 
The mortar became damp, causing the exterior wires of 
several strands to corrode and break at the strand shoes. 
At the time of that occurrence, the bridge still had only 
two cables. It was estimated that corrosion damage had 
caused a loss of 13 percent of the strength of the cables. 
Damage detected in 1 892 was repaired by splicing wire 
segments to the corroded wire ends. The work was com­
pleted in 1 892, and for some time, the strand ends were 
encased in an oil bath (7). 
In 1 898, the bridge was rebuilt and two new cables 
were superimposed over the original ones. The new 
secondary cables were made of bare steel wire. To 
accommodate the secondary cables, separate anchorages 
were made for the Ohio side, and the original anchor 
houses were extended on the Kentucky side. The new 
cables were tied to the original ones using solid vertical 
bars to interconnect cable bands. Loading of the second­
ary cables was adjusted by tightening threaded sleeve nuts 
located on the bars. The secondary cables were added to 
allow electric street cars to run on the bridge. 
Superficial visual examination of the wrapped cables 
revealed no major physical defects. The wrapping and 
paint appeared to be in good condition. The cables were 
last painted in 1974. Only a slight amount of chipped 
paint was detected, this being primarily in the original 
upstream cable at midspan where the cable borders the 
sidewalk. Some of the chipping appeared to be due to 
vandalism. Rust-colored stains were visible at some cable 
bands. The nature of those stains could not be ascertained 
due to lack of physical access to those places. During the 
inspection, water was detected dripping from the lower 
upstream cables near the low point of the cable at mid­
span. Leakage was slight and eminated from a splice point 
in the wrapping (Figure 16). Moderate rusting was de­
tected on the suspender cables near the lower hangers. 
Previous experience had shown resulting corrosion damage 
to be slight (8) . A high-voltage electric cable was leaking 
oil on the upstream original cable near the middle of the 
span. The oil may cause the paint to deteriorate in that 
area. 
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An inspection was also made on the secondary cable 
at the Kentucky-tower roller supports. The upper cables, 
located in the tower turrets, were covered with a thick 
layer of pigeon droppings. The stay cables were also 
covered with pigeon manure (Figure 17). Bird screen was 
in place on the turret apertures, but the pigeons had ob­
viously penetrated that defense. One broken wire was 
detected on the downstream cable at the roller support. 
The original cables were not inspected at the tower. 
The anchorages were given a thorough examination, 
due to history of wire corrosion at those locations. 
Inspection was made of all four original cable anchor 
houses. The upstream Kentucky secondary anchor­
house entrance opened to the roadway. Traffic on the 
bridge prevented inspection in that anchorage. 
All anchor-house entrances have two doors. The 
outer doors were paneled with a heavy steel screen, the 
inner doors were made of sheet steel. The doors had 
latches and hasps for padlocks. However, all entrances 
were without locks. At several locations, both doors were 
found partially open. At most of the other entrances, the 
solid inner doors were found open. 
Stepladders were required to enter the anchorages 
elevated from the sidewalks. Entrance into the upstream 
Ohio original cable anchorage was hazardous; the ladder 
had to be placed on a sidewalk stairway. Most of the 
closed doors were partially jammed, making entry 
difficult. The anchor houses were unlit, and sunlight from 
the entrance was inadequate for inspection. 
Three original anchor houses showed evidence of 
water leaking from the roofs of both upstream anchorages 
and the Kentucky downstream anchorage. Water seepage 
into the Ohio downstream anchorage was slight and the 
anchor assemblies and strands were not damaged. In other 
original anchorages, water had dripped onto the strands, 
eye bars, and anchor assemblies, causing a deterioration of 
a whitewash wall-and-ceiling coating. Wrought-iron roof 
beams were also rusted. The dissolved whitewash was 
deposited as a white residue at spots where leaks impinged 
on wires and anchor assemblies. 
All metal surfaces in the anchorages were coated 
with a thick layer of red lead under a brown topcoat, 
which was apparently a primer. That paint was in good 
condition in all places where water had not leaked onto 
the cables. Leakage had deteriorated the paint and 
_ 1everely corroded underlying metal (Figure 1 8). Old wire 
breaks were observed at the three anchorages that had 
leakage problems. The number of breaks ranged from one 
Figure I S .  The Covington Bridge. 
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Figure 16. Water seepage from original upstream cable 
at midspan. Seepage is occurring at the splice 
point in the wrapping. 
in the Kentucky downstream anchorage to three in the 
Kentucky upstream anchorage. Most of the broken wire 
ends had been painted, indicating these probably predate 
the present leakage problem. Unpainted broken ends of 
the wires showed severe general corrosion and loss-of­
section near the fractures. 
Many wires in the lower s trands contain splices 
that presumably date to 1892. Most splices were located 
on the lower portion of the strands and were inaccessible. 
The splices were made by interlooping mating 
wire ends and wrapping each looped end to the parent 
wire with a tie wire (Figure 19). This type of splice does 
not provide high joint strength and was not the type of 
splice employed by Roebling on the wires of the main 
Figure 17 .  Pigeon droppings on a secondary cable, 
inside the Kentucky-tower turret. 
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Figure 1 8. Deterioration to the strands due to roof 
leakage in the original anchor house. 
cable (9). Since many of the spliced wires were loose, it is 
questionable whether those wires were bearing any load. 
Besides roof leakage, moisture was observed on the 
strands adjacent to the splay saddle in the downstream 
Kentucky anchorage. That may be caused by leakage of 
water from the wrapped cable or by a sealing failure at 
the splay-saddle collar located outside the anchorage. 
The Kentucky secondary anchorages were con­
structed as extensions of the original anchorages. The 
secondary cables entered those anchorages through the 
roofs .  The strands and anchor assemblies employed the 
same paint system used on the original cables. Strands in 
the downstream, Kentucky secondary anchorage house 
were covered with a light dust. The upper surface of the 
strands were rough in a few locations, indicating possible 
presence of light rust under the paint. Excluding that ob­
servation, the paint and strands appeared to be in very 
good condition. A skylight was situated in the ceiling 
directly over the anchorage assembly. That was a make­
shift installation, consis ting of an old steel-framed glass 
Figure 19.  Wire splice in original cable anchor house. 
window and a detour sign. tiowever, there was no indi­
cation of water leakage on the strands. 
The Ohio secondary cables were housed in sepantc 
anchorages located under the Ohio approach. The cables 
entered through large open portals in the headwalls of the 
anchorages. One unusual feature was the slight splaying of 
the cables before they entered the anchorages. The 
splayed portion of the cables was sheathed in a sheet­
metal jacket that extended down to the splay saddles. 
The concrete, approach curbs were cast directly against 
the cable sheaths where cables crossed the curbs into 
anchorages. 
The Ohio secondary anchorages were very dusty. At 
the time of inspection, the bridge trusses were being re­
painted and the large open cable portals allowed the sand­
blast refuse to enter the anchor houses. Pigeons had fre­
quented the upstream anchor house, depositing bird drop­
pings and feathers on the strands (Figure 20). The con­
crete approach roadway served as the roof for the anchor­
ages. The ceilings in the anchorages, made of metal stay­
in-place forms, had greenish stains and appeared to 
be corroding due to salting of the overhead roadway 
( F igure � 1  ) .  Sc)me '>\hie-:: t-es id :k w�1s de tected on the up­
per portions of scvcral suands. This ind icated some 
roof leakage may h�lve t aken pl:::tce. 
The strands Jnd anchor assemblies were painted in 
the same manner as had been employed in the other 
anchorages. The paint appeared to be in good condition 
at most of the locations inspected. There was no sign of 
paint cracking or peeling; however, the upper surfaces of 
some strands were slightly rusted. This rust was detected 
under a heavy layer of black sandblast material that lay on 
the upper surfaces of the strands. Several strands were 
found to be rusted and swollen between the strands 
seizings in both anchorages (Figure 22). Those strands 
were connected to the lowest shoes on the anchor 
assemblies near the anchorage floor. 
One break was found in the upper strands of the up­
stream anchor house, near the cable portal. Since the 
broken end had been painted, the cause of fracture could 
not be determined. One wire in the downstream 
anchorage ran between two adjacent strands. The wire was 
taut. Whether this was due to an impressed load or to ten· 
sian caused by the seizings could not be determined. In 
Figure 20. Cahle strands in the upstream Ohio secondary anchor house. Note the pigeon pollution and sandblast refuse on 
the strands. 
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Figure 21. Stains on the ceiling of the upstream Ohio 
secondary anchor house. 
either case, it was a sign of poor workmanship . 
The Covington Bridge showed many signs of tres­
pass. As with other Ohio River bridges in the Covington 
area, vagrants use the bridge as a private accommodation 
and toile t. Youths climb over the bridges for recreation. 
Grafitti has been carved into masonary of the anchor­
house walls. Beer cans and whisky bottles were found in 
four anchor houses. Entry can be made into the Ohio 
secondary anchor houses by sliding down the cables 
through the large cable portals. It is possible that corro­
sion damage of the lower strands in the Ohio secon­
dary anchorages was caused by persons urinating on the 
wires. Cyclone fencing guarding the Kentucky tower stair­
way had been pried open, and empty beer cans were 
strewn about the stairs and tower. 
Activity of the pigeons is disconcerting. Pigeon 
droppings can expose workers to histoplasmosis. Pigeon 
dung combines with water to form acids, which in turn 
may cause corrosion cracking in the wires. A large quan­
tity of pigeon dung is deposited on the cables at the tower 
roller supports. Those are points of high stress con-
Figure 22. Swollen strands in the downstream Ohio 
secondary anchor house. 
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centrations. Since the upper cables are unwrapped at the 
supports, the only cable protection is paint. The broken 
wire on the downstream secondary cable should provide 
sufficient warning as to the potential danger of that 
situation. Pigeon droppings are not as concentrated on the 
strands in the Ohio secondary anchorages. However, that 
is also of concern because the strands in the anchorages 
are only protected by primer coatings. 
The secondary cables were designed to bear more 
than half the bridge loading. The cable wires are bare 
uncoated steel wires similar to those used in the first 
Portsmouth cables. The first Portsmouth wires failed by 
corrosion cracking after only 12 years of service. The steel 
wires on the Covington Bridge have been in service for 82 
years. 
While no major structural defects were observed on 
the Covington Bridge, problem areas were located that 
will require remedial action in the near future. The scope 
of this investigation was limited . More in-depth work is 
needed to ascertain whether corrosion problems exist in 
areas where physical access is limited, such as, the interior 
of the wrapped cables and under cable bands. Detection 
of seepage from the original cables makes inspection 
imperative in the next few years. While the wires in 
the original cables are made of wrought iron, they will still 
fracture if sevt::rely corroded. Such failures have been de­
tected on the wrought-iron cables of the 130-year-old 
Wheeling Bridge ( 10). 
A 7 2-hour traffic survey was conducted on the 
Covington Bridge during the period of October 6-9, 1980. 
Results are shown in Table 2. The daily traffic volume was 
17,400 vehicles. Restriction of traffic on the Central 
Bridge will probably increase the loading on the Coving­
ton Bridge. Traffic was predominately light vehicles and 
buses. A Cincinnati bus-company terminal feeds directly 
onto the Ohio approach and is responsible for most bus 
traffic. 
Table 2. Traffic Su rvey on the Covington Suspension 
Bridge (72 Hours) for Both Lanes. 
Type of 
Vehicle Count Percentage 
Autos and Pickups 47,553 91. 1 4  
B uses 3,595 6.89 
SU-2A-4T 134 0.26 
SU-2A-6T 605 1.16 
SU-3A 62 0.12 
SU-4A 0 0.00 
C-3A 25 0.05 
C-4A 34 0.07 
C-5A 158 0.30 
C-6A 2 0.01 
Total 52,168 100.00 
Note: Survey conducted between 1 :00 pm on 10/6/80 and 
1 :00 pm on 10/9/80. 
Conclusions 
No major structural damage was detected on the 
cables of either Kentucky suspension bridge. However, it 
should be noted that the scope of the present work was 
limited, and additional examinations should be performed 
on both bridges to ensure their structural integrity. In 
the future, both bridges will require considerable mainte­
nance to preserve their present structural soundness. Any 
main terrance work on the cables should be deferred until 
a better knowledge of the cable condition has been 
achieved. 
Both Kentucky bridges have probably met, or ex­
ceeded, their anticipated service lives. The bridges have 
sufficiency ratings less than 50 (34.6 for the Covington 
Bridge and 20.6 for the Maysville Bridge), making them 
eligible for replacement under the FHWA Bridge Replace­
ment and Rehabilitation Program (BRRP). The low rat­
ings mainly are due to roadway dimensions and design 
load capacity -- not physical deterioration. 
It would be impractical to modify the bridges to 
achieve passible sufficiency ratings (50+). Usually, this 
fact would make the bridges ineligible for rehabilitation 
using BRRP funds. However, there are mitigating circum­
stances favoring preservation of both bridges. The bridges 
have historical significance and are closely identified 
with the culture of their respective communities. This 
may allow use of BRRP funds to rehabilitate the bridges 
( 11). Many older suspension bridges in the New York City 
area are being renovated using federal funds ( 12). 
The Covington Bridge was the second bridge to span 
the Ohio River. It has been in use for 113 years and 
serves as a monument to the engineering genius of John A. 
Roebling, the noted suspension bridge builder. To the best 
knowledge, this is the oldest American bridge still in full 
active service. Owing to the fact that it is registered as 
historic property by the National Register of Historic 
Places, it would be extremely difficult to have such a 
prominent national landmark demolished. Therefore, as 
long as the bridge remains standing, some utility should be 
gained from it. 
While the Maysville Bridge lacks the rich heritage of 
the Covington Bridge, it  still has historical significance. It 
was one of the first suspension bridges ever built em­
ploying structural strand. Its stark functionalism is typical 
of many successive bridges built during the era of the late 
1920's and 1930's. That period is oftimes referred to as 
the 11Golden Era" of bridges. Due to its many inno· 
vations, the Maysville Bridge can be considered a proto­
type of a genre of economical short-span suspension 
bridges. It is an outstanding example of this type of struc­
ture. The bridge is a strongly-identified local landmark. It 
is replicated on the Maysville logo. At this tbne, several 
communities between Maysville and Ashland are request­
ing erection of new bridges over the Ohio River. If all 
requested bridges are constructed, a capital outlay of over 
100 million dollars will be required. It would be difficult 
to justify demolishing an old yet functional structure 
whose continued existence would offset some very 
expensive construction desired in this region. 
Some comments are required about past mainte­
nance on the suspension bridges that will serve as a frame­
work for the subsequent recommendations. Unfortu­
nately, both suspension bridges have been subject to 
neglect. Maintenance has been performed on them 
only when absolutely necessary and, then, only when a 
problem had manifested itself on a large scale and was 
expensive to correct. For instance, the bridges have been 
painted only when paint chipping and rust were visible on 
many parts of the structure, requiring that the entire 
bridge be painted by contract. Poor housekeeping in the 
anchorages of both bridges indicates proper routine 
maintenance is lacking. 
Most potential problems and early signs of deterio­
ration on large bridges are usually detected during annual 
inspections performed by the Division of Bridge Mainten­
ance. The 1977 report of annual joint inspection of the 
Covington Bridge is a good example of this work (13). 
The report was written by B. Compton of the Division of 
Bridge Maintenance. The report mentioned loose (broken) 
wires in the anchorages, strand swelling due to corrosion, 
the pigeon problem in the towers, and rust stains around 
the exterior portion c f  the splay saddles (which the 
present inspection overlooked). Some of the anchorage 
wire problems haVe been known for many years. The roof 
leakage may have occurred some time after the 1977 
report. If so, its deleterious action is more aggressive than 
originally presumed. There were no signs that action was 
taken to cure the cable-related problems enumerated in 
the 1977 report. 
While indications of impending problems of the 
Kentucky suspension bridges are not as dramatic as find­
ing a large number of broken wires, the need for immedi­
ate action is as great. Discovery of major defects in the 
cables of either bridge is not anticipated; however, this 
work is necessary to ensure safety of the public. At the 
time of closure, the Portsmouth Bridge was, in the 
author's opinion, in a structurally critical condition. That 
was not determined until some six months after the bridge 
was closed when the cable bands were removed; The Ohio 
Department of Transportation acted promptly and 
correctly in closing the structure at the first signs of 
increasing structural decay. However, KYDOT would be 
remiss in allowing either Kentucky suspension bridge to 
deteriorate to a similar structural state as that of the 
Portsmouth Bridge prior to its closure. 
A final comment should be made, related to both 
corrosion and trespass problems. The words of D. B. 
Steinman (14) are particularly apt, "The safety of a sus­
pension bridge depends on the security of its anchorage." 
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Recommendations 
l .  Comprehensive inspections should be performed 
on the interior portions of cables on the Covington and 
Maysville Bridges. Work on the Maysville Bridge should 
have priority over the Covington Bridge. 
(a) Inspections should include the main cables 
on both side spans and the main span. Each cable should 
be inspected by unwrapping at least four different loca­
tions for an entire panel length. Interior inspection can be 
performed by wedging (wood, brass, or plastic wedges) 
the strands apart. 
(b) At least four cable bands per bridge should be 
removed for inspection of the underlying wires. This will 
require fabrication of a lifting jig to eliminate the dead 
load from the tands prior to removing the suspender 
cables and disassembling the bands. 
(c) Unwrapped panels may be rewrapped with a 
neoprene-chlorinated rubber paint wrapping of the "USS 
ELASTRO-WRAP SYSTEM" type employed by the 
American Bridge Division of the U. S. Steel Corporation. 
This work should be scheduled so completion will be no 
later than a September to allow proper curing of the 
wrapping material. 
(d) Suggested locations for wrapping and band re­
moval could be provided by the Transportation Research 
Program. Manpower requirements may necessitate the 
work be performed by contract. Four consulting firms -· 
Howard, Tammen & Rergendoff; Modjeski and Masters; 
Steinman, Boyton,  Granquist & Birdsall ; and Amann and 
Whitney -- have suspension bridge experience necessary to 
perform inspections. 
2. Install 16 inspection ports on the main cables of 
the Covington Bridge. One port should be installed per 
cable on all the side spans and on opposing shallow in· 
clines of the main span. A comprehensive cable inspection 
using a lift-boom should precede this work. The lift-boom 
would allow inspectors to locate points where problems 
may be expected, such as locations that have rust stains 
or disturbed wrapping . Cables should be cleared of bird 
dung at the towers. Paint should be removed from the 
outer strands, which are unwrapped at those locations. 
The exposed wires should be thoroughly inspected for 
cracks. The cables then could be repainted with a chlori· 
nated-rubber paint. 
It would be desirable to perform a comprehensive inspec­
tion of the Covington Bridge approximately one year after 
inspection ports are installed. 
3. Modifications should be made on both bridges to 
prevent corrosive attack in the anchor houses and to pro­
mote good housekeeping. 
(a) The Maysville Bridge anchorages should be 
equipped with lockable doors installed at ground level to 
provide entrance to the anchor houses. If flooding is 
possible at ground level, watertight doors should be 
used. Existing sidewalk entrances should be sealed. 
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Lighting and electrical outlets should be placed in the 
anchor houses. Anchor houses should be thoroughly 
cleaned. All exterior windows should be permanently 
sealed. Floor drains should be cleared. Interior walls and 
floors of the anchor houses should be painted a light 
off-white color. Strands and anchor assemblies should be 
cleaned and repainted with a chlorinated-rubber paint. 
The mouth of each sleeve bushing should be sealed with a 
zinc-impregnated grease where the strand end enters the 
anchor socket assembly. Electrical dehumidifying and 
dust-eliminating devices should also be considered for 
installation if problems with humidity and corrosion 
persist. 
(b) The roofs of the original Covington Bridge 
anchorages should be sealed to eliminate water seepage on 
the strands. If necessary, simple covers should be placed 
over the strands and anchor assemblies to prevent direct 
impingement of water. All anchor houses should be 
thoroughly cleaned. Walls of the anchorages should be 
painted a light off.white color. Cable entrance portals 
on the Ohio secondary anchorages should be permanently 
sealed.  Strands and anchor assemblies should be cleaned 
and painted with chlorinated-rubber paint. Permanent 
ladders should be installed on all anchorages (this may 
involve extensive masonry work on the Kentucky second­
ary upstream anchor house). Doors to all anchorages 
should be fitted with weatherstripping. All doors should 
be fixed to function properly. Locks should be used on 
each entrance. Each anchorage should be fitted with 
electrical lights and outlets. Electrical dehumidifying and 
dust-eliminating devices should be installed in the ancho­
rage houses. The ceilings of the Ohio secondary ancho­
rages need to be sealed to prevent leakage of salt water 
onto the strands. 
(c) Cable handrails should be installed on both 
cables of the Covington Bridge to facilitate exterior in­
spection. 
(d) Pigeon droppings should be cleaned from 
secondary cables at the towers. Cables should be re­
painted at the towers with a chlorinated-rubber paint. 
Heavier screens or perforated steel plating, cut to a good 
fit, should be installed. Consideration should be given to 
installing sonic bird-repelling devices, such as the 
"ULTRASON ET " manufactured by the BIRD-X Cor­
poration of Chicago, lllinois. 
4. An effort should be made to stop unauthorized 
trespass on the bridges. This may require enclosing walk­
ways with chain-link cages. Lockable intruder guards 
should be placed on access ladders. Law-enforcement 
officials should be persuaded to deter vagrants and juve­
niles from frequenting unauthorized portions of the 
bridges. This may be aided by placing microwave or  ultra­
sonic intruder alarms on key locations of the bridges. The 
alarms could be tied into remote police monitors or to 
audible alarms located near points of intrusion. The pre­
vention of frequent vandalism to bridge lighting systems 
would justify this effort. 
5. The Maysville Bridge cables will eventually need 
renovation to increase corrosion resistance. Four 
approaches to this problem have been considered: (!) 
inject a inhibitor-impregnated plastic into the inter­
stices of the cables and rewrap with the conventional 
wire-paint system; (2) install covers over the cables; (3) 
rewrap the cables with a neoprene-chlorinated-rubber 
paint wrapping system ;  (4) cover existing wrapping with a 
high-build chlorinated-rubber paint. One of the last three 
proposals may also be used in conjunction with the first 
proposal. Expected cost of such work is about two million 
dollars. If cables of the Covington Bridge show significant 
deterioration, similar work may be required. 
6. An effort should be made to alter traffic flow 
on the bridges, especially during periods of peak usage. 
Relocation of the bus terminal on the Ohio approach of 
the Covington Bridge probably precludes limiting the 
bridge only to cars� however, it would be desirable to ex-
elude all truck traffic from the bridge. The Covington 
Bridge is a functional landmark, but its use should be re­
stricted. Theoretically ,  cables of the Maysville Bridge 
are more than satisfactory to handle present loads. How­
ever, the truss may be slightly over-extended by infre­
quent heavy loads (15). If impending internal inspec­
tion reveals no defects, with the projected renovation, the 
bridge may probably remain in service for another 50 
years. The situation may warrant building another bridge 
in the Maysville area. A two-lane bridge could be con­
structed to bypass the commercial district of Maysville. 
Then, the suspension bridge could be retained for urban 
traffic between Maysville and Aberdeen, Ohio. Continu­
ous right-turn lanes at the end of each approach would 
greatly aid in reducing congested traffic that accumulates 
on the bridge during peak-use periods. 
7 .  Steps should be taken to ensure faster imple­
mentation of maintenance work suggested by the annual 
inspection reports. This is especially true of defects 
related to suspension bridge cables. 
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